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Abstract
This paper introduces an original concept (projective anthropomorphism) towards exploring a psychological dimension that 
is irreducible to the forms of anthropomorphism investigated in both cognitive science and social robotics. Projective anthro-
pomorphism is an unconscious bias towards anticipating humanlike characteristics in robots. An overview of the variety of 
ways in which projection has been conceptualised in psychology and psychoanalysis is provided before discussing implica-
tions for theorising projective anthropomorphism. The proposed concept alludes to the projection of existential anxieties 
and desires onto myths, legends, linguistic tropes, and science-fiction motifs of humanoid automata. Such motifs and their 
associated narratives populate contemporary popular culture, and feed into social representations of robots. The importance 
of considering projective anthropomorphism lies in the extent to which its phenomena channel people’s expectations and 
attitudes towards technological artefacts, as well as steering technological possibilities.
Keywords Anthropomorphism · Psychological projection · Human–robot interaction
1 Introduction
Investigations and discussions of anthropomorphism in 
human–robot interaction (HRI) settings typically pertain to 
persons’ interactions with an actual machine, whether the 
robot is physically present, an image on a screen, or a design 
concept. Anthropomorphic phenomena in this context vary 
along a dimension from involuntary reactions to a robot’s 
physical appearance or behaviour as if it were human (reac-
tive anthropomorphism) to deliberately designing robots 
with humanlike features (proactive anthropomorphism). 
The heterogeneity of such phenomena means that various 
manifestations are likely to differ in terms of their underly-
ing psychological mechanisms, triggers, motivations, and 
functions.
Moreover, a robot is not only a machine that engineers 
build but is also a semiotic object, comprised of signs and 
symbols, and constructed in discourse and imagination [1]. 
Images of manmade humanlike automata have populated 
the imagination for millennia in myths, legends, and modern 
popular culture. From the standpoint of depth psychology 
(psychoanalytical and other psychodynamic perspectives), 
these motifs could be understood as products of a symbol-
forming mechanism whereby unconscious preoccupations 
are brought into conscious awareness through projections 
in the form of concrete images, tales, and artefacts. In this 
sense, anthropomorphic motifs are emergent properties of 
a tacit dialogue with our ‘inner’ selves, collectively as well 
as individually.
Projective anthropomorphism (a term coined here) con-
cerns this aspect of the discourse of social robotics. It is 
definable an unconscious bias towards anticipating human-
like characteristics in robots. Projective anthropomorphism 
is irreducible to either reactive or proactive forms of anthro-
pomorphism, as argued in Sects. 2 and 3. Put another way, 
projective anthropomorphism cannot be placed on the bipo-
lar reactive-proactive dimension, but could be construed as 
an orthogonal dimension that intersects with the former, and 
potentially complements our understanding of robotics as 
a human endeavour in general. Section 4 reviews psycho-
logical concepts of projection so as to identify the present 
application of the term. Having set conceptual parameters, 
Sect. 5 provides some examples. Finally, Sect. 6 returns to 
the idea that a robot is also a semiotic object [1]. Drawing 
upon psychoanalytical theories, this section speculatively 
considers psychological functions that the compulsion to 
imagine humanoid automata might serve.
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2  Explaining Anthropomorphic Reactions
The extant literature on the psychological phenomenon of 
anthropomorphism centres on describing and explaining 
people’s anthropomorphic reactions. It is generally believed 
that the activation of anthropomorphic stereotypes in peo-
ple through robots’ humanlike appearance or behaviour can 
bring a sense of familiarity, confidence and simplicity into 
people’s interactions with these novel agents. This in turn 
may encourage trust and acceptance of social robots. Robot 
design and marketing benefits from fact-finding empiricist 
research that identifies conditions under which people are 
more likely to respond to a robot as if it were human, and 
the extent to which their experience is likely to be associ-
ated with positive or negative affect.
Research in cognitive science, on the other hand, seeks 
to establish universal causal mechanisms that may account 
for the occurrence of anthropomorphism whenever it hap-
pens. The three-factors theory of anthropomorphism out-
lines three psychological determinants of this phenom-
enon: (1) the extent to which anthropocentric knowledge is 
accessible and applicable (elicited agent knowledge); (2) a 
motivation to explain and understand other agents’ behav-
iour (effectance motivation); and (3) a desire for social 
contact and affiliation (sociality motivation) [2]. While the 
theory does not focus solely on robots, its authors point 
out practical implications for HRI: humanoid features can 
enhance people’s sense of familiarity and affinity when 
interacting with the robot. Findings reported in [3], for 
instance, lend support to the first determinant outlined in 
the three-factors theory, namely that people generalise ini-
tial attributions across agent categories.
The authors of [4] similarly postulate a cognitive mech-
anism characterised by a dual process: initially a fast intu-
itive process classifies an object as humanlike (implicit 
anthropomorphism), and is followed with a conscious 
reflective process that may moderate the initial judgment 
(explicit anthropomorphism). While empirical support for 
that hypothesis is tentative at present, its gist has intuitive 
appeal. Turkle’s anecdotal account of her response to Cog 
when visiting Rodney Brooks’ lab at MIT captures this 
duality: ‘My response was involuntary … visceral. Cog 
had a face, it made eye contact, and it followed my move-
ments. … although I knew Cog to be a machine, I had to 
fight my instinct to react to “him” as a person’ [5, p. 84].
Cognitive models such as cited above aim to explain 
reactions to objects that are available to sensory perception 
in the here-and-now. Theories in this vein may shed light 
on what causes anthropomorphic reactions in brief expo-
sures to robots within experimental procedures, as if in a 
vacuum. Idiographic factors, such as the meaning that the 
encounter with Cog had for Turkle, fall outside the remit 
of the ‘classic’ scientific paradigm. The visceral experi-
ence she described did not remain contained within that 
moment in the lab. Her experience became interwoven into 
her narrative, including her reasons for telling about it in 
her book. Moreover, theories such as the aforementioned 
do not concern motivations to create humanoid robots, let 
alone why human beings have been telling imaginative sto-
ries of humanoid automata across cultures and millennia.
3  Building Humanlike Robots
From the standpoint of functional design, when the purpose 
is to build socially interactive robots for everyday applica-
tions, the objective is to create a robot that outwardly appears 
to be socially intelligent though its internal workings may 
not resemble the human mind [6].
Socially assistive robots (SAR) are sometimes given a 
humanoid appearance so as to enhance users’ sense of famil-
iarity and affinity. For example, Dautenhahn and her team 
at the University of Hertfordshire have developed Kaspar, 
a talking robot with a simplified human face and moveable 
limbs and features [7]. This robot is designed to help chil-
dren with autism or communication difficulties to develop 
essential social skills through games such as peekaboo, imi-
tation games, and learning activities. Having the doll-like 
robot looking like a boy presumably enhances the child’s 
sense of affinity. Other designers of robots for children opt 
for more cartoon-like or abstract forms. Leka, also devel-
oped for work with autistic children, is a small sphere with 
a minimalist face. Its creator is quoted as saying that when 
children performing a task with Leka get it right, ‘the robot 
reacts emotionally,’ by flashing happy facial expressions; 
“The kids love it.”’ [8, p. 1]. Giving humanlike character-
istics to SARs is conducive to making users experience the 
interaction as more natural. This strategy responds to the 
engineering challenges that [1] has termed ‘the classic prob-
lem of natural interaction in HRI; namely, how to design 
robots that have at least some human social characteristics’ 
(p. 93). Engineers may harness knowledge of cognitive 
mechanisms underlying anthropomorphic reactions towards 
optimising users’ positive experience of the interaction. As 
the example of Leka suggests, humanlike behaviour, speech 
and emotional expression might be more crucial for people’s 
perception of robot sociality than a humanoid appearance 
would be.
Engineers who opt for a functional design often give 
their robots behavioural characteristics of intentional agents 
though they do not need to understand how human cognition 
‘really works’ [6, p. 147]. In contrast, biologically inspired 
design aims to create robots that internally mimic human 
cognition. For example, Cog was originally built by Brooks 
and his team at MIT in the 1990s. According to the project’s 
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website, the motivation behind creating Cog stemmed from 
the hypothesis that ‘humanoid intelligence requires human-
oid interactions with the world’ [9]. Brooks and cowriters 
identified two goals of building humanoid robots: ‘an engi-
neering goal of building a prototype general purpose flex-
ible and dextrous autonomous robot and a scientific goal of 
understanding human cognition’ [10, p. 52]. The scientific 
goal accords with the synthetic approach in cognitive sci-
ence, which first became possible with the advent of comput-
ers in the late 1940s. It complements the analytic approach, 
whereby scientists try to understand the mind through sys-
tematic observations and experiments. Scientists who opt for 
the synthetic approach try to understand the mind through 
modelling cognitive architectures in computers and robots. 
Within this specialised context, the authors of [10] argue 
against seeking to understand human cognition by virtue 
of disembodied computer simulation, since our cognition is 
essentially embodied (hence the motivation to build Cog).
Whether computers or robots are used for modelling men-
tal processes, however, the shared epistemological position 
is that scientists can have a candidate explanation for some 
phenomenon by building an artificial system based on the 
principles that are believed to underlie the real phenomenon. 
The possibility of reverse engineering the human mind goes 
hand in hand with reverse anthropomorphism; that is, look-
ing at ourselves and seeing a machine. As Brooks put it, 
‘Humans, after all, are machines made up of organic mol-
ecules whose interactions can all be aped (we think) by suf-
ficiently powerful computers’ [11, p. 86]. The entrenched 
view of man as a machine has been perpetuated since at least 
1747, when La Mettrie first published his thesis L’homme 
machine. It has made possible a wide range of technological 
advances, but it resonates with technological determinism; 
and, in turn, manifests also in a tendency to reduce the con-
cept of a social interaction to superficial mechanistic aspects, 
such as taking turns in a conversation or reciprocating emo-
tional expressions [1]. Faith in the possibility of reverse 
engineering the mind might lead to an expectation that a 
biologically inspired approach to robot design could result 
in making a good-enough fake that is closer to having genu-
ine intentionality and self-consciousness. Yet, modelling 
the human mind on a machine leaves out the very ‘spark’ 
that motivates humans to contemplate their own nature, and 
fires some scientists’ ambition to seek this understanding by 
building humanlike robots.
4  Varieties of Psychological Projection
It could be argued that any form of anthropomorphism 
involves projection (we project humanlike attributes onto 
something that does not have them). However, both the 
words ‘projection’ and ‘projective’ are used in psychology 
in a variety of ways, some of which contradict each other 
insofar as the same terminology refers to fundamentally 
different psychological functions. This section provides an 
overview of the main usages before discussing some of the 
implications for theorising ‘projective anthropomorphism’.
Centring on social cognition, Baumeister and his cowrit-
ers [12] draw a distinction between projection as a cognitive 
bias, on the one side, and projection as a defence mecha-
nism in the Freudian sense, on the other. Conceptualised as 
a cognitive bias, projection ranges from naively perceiving 
one’s own traits (good and bad) in other people to inaccu-
rately perceiving others as having traits that one believes one 
does not have. In contradistinction, Freud conceptualised 
projection as a defence mechanism whereby perceiving an 
undesirable trait in others serves to avoid recognising this 
trait in oneself. Baumeister et al. contend that the cognitive-
bias option is well supported with research evidence whereas 
the Freudian theory has little empirical support. Either way, 
the multiple ways of understanding projection ‘vary mainly 
along the dimension of how effectively the undesirable trait 
or motive is repudiated as part of the self’ [12, p. 1090]. 
This dimension, however, cannot accommodate the Jungian 
conceptualisation of projection, for instance, or the so-called 
Projective Hypothesis that informs certain methods of per-
sonality assessment (described later in this section).
In contrast to Freud’s assumption of a mechanism serv-
ing ‘to fend off an idea that was intolerable to [the patient’s] 
ego by projecting its subject-matter into the external world’ 
(Freud 1895, quoted in [13, p. 2]), C. G. Jung postulated 
a mechanism of projection as necessary for the integra-
tion of the personality (individuation). The Jungian model 
describes the psyche as an equilibrium-seeking system that 
comprises conscious and unconscious opposites, such as 
ego and shadow, gender and counter-gender (anima is the 
feminine in a man, animus is the masculine in a woman). 
An unconscious element can be brought to consciousness 
only when it is seen in other people and is subsequently 
recognised as a projection (rather than naively believing it 
to be a trait of the other person): ‘The shadow can be real-
ized only through a relation to a partner, and anima and 
animus only through a relation to a partner of the opposite 
sex’ ([14] para. 42). Hence, contrary to the Freudian premise 
that projection hides some inconvenient truth about oneself, 
the Jungian construal points to a non-pathological process 
that functions towards opening up one’s awareness of one’s 
whole personality.
Freud himself talked about projection also in a more 
general sense, and his followers further elaborated diverse 
meanings. As [13] outlines, some psychoanalysts placed 
the emphasis on projection as a defence mechanism, but the 
term has acquired a variety of meanings within that con-
text. Another direction was taken by Melanie Klein and her 
followers, who placed the emphasis on ‘projection as the 
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process whereby the ego expelled (projected) its own sadis-
tic impulses into the external world’ [13, p. 4]. The concept 
of projective identification (articulated by Klein in 1946) 
posits a pathological process whereby ‘parts of the self and 
internal objects are split off and projected into the external 
object, which then becomes possessed by, controlled and 
identified with the projected parts’ (quoted in [15, p. 13]).
The adjective ‘projective’ in Klein’s concept of projec-
tive identification indicates a markedly different psychologi-
cal phenomenon than does the same adjective in the case 
of projective methods of personality assessment, such as 
the Rorschach inkblot test and Thematic Apperception Test 
(TAT). The designation ‘protective’ was introduced by Frank 
in 1939 [16] in order to differentiate this methodology from 
so-called ‘objective’ methods such as standardised self-
report inventories. A projective method entails presenting 
material or a task that is designed or chosen for pre-empt-
ing any preconceived expectations about the desirability 
of the response. While the Rorschach and TAT require the 
subject—who may be a client in clinical assessment or a 
research participant—to respond to a standard set of visual 
stimuli, the House–Tree–Person (H–T–P) technique requires 
the subject to make a freehand drawing of a house, tree, and 
person [17]. Other techniques require sentence completion 
or manipulating objects (see a review in [18]). An obvious 
though nontrivial difference between the kind of projection 
that takes place during the performance of projective tests 
and the kinds of projection discussed earlier lies in whether 
the target of projection is a real person or not. People do not 
‘identify’ with an inkblot, for instance, cannot inaccurately 
perceive the traits of a human figure painted in a TAT picture 
or ‘get wrong’ the person they draw in the H–T–P test.
Historically, projective methodology was loosely associ-
ated with the psychoanalytical ethos of the early twentieth 
century, but the multiple techniques that have proliferated 
since then have no specific theory in common. Epistemologi-
cally, these share little more than the so-called the Projective 
Hypothesis, namely the premise that responses to projective 
tests would reveal ‘the personality process or private worlds 
of individuals, … that peculiar, individual way of organizing 
experience and of feeling’ ([16, p. 392], italics in the origi-
nal). The concept of projective anthropomorphism draws 
upon the broad conceptual underpinnings of projective tech-
niques, not the methodology. Nevertheless, a closer look at 
the two most famous ones could be conducive to clarifying 
the present concept.
The Rorschach Inkblot test has been used in clinical set-
tings since its publication by Rorschach in 1921. The pro-
cedure elicits responses to images presented in a standard 
series of ten inkblots. One of the most famous images resem-
bles a winged creature, and most people readily ‘see’ a but-
terfly or a bat. Other inkblots are more ambiguous. Plate 
2 could trigger an anthropomorphic reaction (the present 
author sees two seated people with red turbans facing each 
other with hands touching), although [19] gives examples of 
widely diverse associations evoked by this inkblot. In terms 
of cognitive mechanisms, responses to inkblots fall into phe-
nomena of pareidolia, i.e. the tendency to see meaningful 
patterns in a random stimulus such as clouds, rocks, cracks 
in the ground, and the Moon’s surface [20]. Clinical practi-
tioners who use the Rorschach or similar techniques, how-
ever, analyse patients’ free associations towards uncovering 
their idiosyncratic thought patterns, defences and uncon-
scious preoccupations. Turkle indirectly extrapolated the 
Projective Hypothesis to HRI when suggesting that ‘robotic 
creatures become enhanced in their capacities to enact sce-
narios in which robots are Rorschachs, projective screens for 
individual concerns’ [21, p. 2]. The concept proposed by the 
present author starts with a similar premise, but extricates 
the phenomenon in focus from the human–robot dyad (the 
next section expands).
The TAT was first developed by Henry Murray and asso-
ciates in the 1930s in accordance with Murray’s theory of 
psychogenic needs [22]. The procedure elicits imaginative 
stories of what is happening in a standard set of pictures 
printed on large cards, which show ambiguous situations. 
The original set includes also a blank card. The stories 
that are projected onto these cards are believed to disclose 
personal needs and motivations. It may be speculated that 
‘robot’ (as an object constructed in discourse and the imagi-
nation) functions somewhat like a TAT picture insofar as we 
imaginatively embed it in storylines that anthropomorphise 
the machine.
5  Instances of projective 
anthropomorphism
As seen, psychological projection can imply functionally dif-
ferent processes in different contexts. The kind of projection 
that takes place during the performance of a projective test 
is arguably the closest to the kind of projection postulated 
here. However, although for some individuals robots might 
serve as ‘projective screens’ (to paraphrase [21]), the very 
existence of robots in modern society—the fact that our spe-
cies creates them—begs the question, why? The purpose of 
articulating a concept of projective anthropomorphism in the 
first instance is to bring this question to the fore by labelling 
an aspect of robot-centred anthropomorphism that hitherto 
has been understated in the field.
In the immediate context, an apt analogy is the H–T–P 
test. To put it whimsically, it is as if on some collective 
level, our species was given the task of drawing Human, 
and has come up with a picture of humanlike automata. 
Fictive stories, legends and myths that humanity has long 
been telling about these projective creations reveal ‘that 
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peculiarly human way of organising experience and of feel-
ing’ (to paraphrase [16]). While projective techniques vary 
in their specific theoretical commitments, they all assert the 
creative aspect of the mind and emphasise the essentially 
holistic nature of mental processes [23]. It is proposed here 
that projective anthropomorphism rests on a creative pro-
cess whereby symbolic representations of holistic expe-
rience of our own being are formed in imaginings of the 
humanoid automaton, and imbue this leitmotif with an aura 
of meaningfulness.
An additional reason for distancing projective anthropo-
morphism from Turkle’s characterisation of robots as ‘Ror-
schachs’ is that a robot is not a neutral image. Unlike an ink-
blot, it has a definite physical appearance and programmed 
mannerism that give the robot its character. Furthermore, a 
robot is not a passive ‘screen’ onto which anything could be 
projected. Robot companions or SARs are designed to be 
responsive. As Turkle herself pointed out, Paro makes eye 
contact, is sensitive to touch, and customises its behaviour 
according to whether it is being stroked gently or aggres-
sively [21]. Moreover, robots come into persons’ lifeworld 
as artefacts already loaded with cultural associations and 
expectations, which reflect culturally specific traditions (e.g. 
in Japan as opposed to the USA; see a summary in [1]). 
This cross-cultural diversity could be explored in further 
elaboration of projective anthropomorphism (beyond this 
paper’s scope).
Phenomena of projective anthropomorphism include 
not only myths, legends, and science-fiction depictions of 
humanlike automata, but also linguistic tropes and delib-
erate ways of talking about actual robots. Technology has 
its own momentum, and as a consequence meanings of the 
word ‘robot’ continue to evolve. The software robot that 
we must prove we are not by checking a reCAPCHA is far 
removed from the kind of robots that have populated mod-
ern imagination since Karel Čapek introduced this word 
to science fiction in his 1921 play R.U.R.: Rossum’s Uni-
versal Robots, and the robots imagined by Isaac Asimov, 
who coined the term ‘robotics’ in his fiction. Yet, tropes 
and images in popular culture, news media, and even aca-
demic papers, continue to perpetuate the ‘archetypal’ robot, 
the mechanical doppelganger. For example, the humanoid 
form is impractical for robotic systems in many workplace 
applications, and yet there seems to be an irresistible urge 
to depict them as humanoid. In 2017, news media were full 
of doom and gloom headlines of how robots will take our 
jobs. In 2018, readers were given the good news: robots 
will create new jobs. Whether the narrative is dystopian or 
utopian, blog articles are often embellished with images 
of humanoid robots. Journalists deliberately choose such 
images because they resonate with readers through shared 
cultural references; but the fact that the motif persists in 
popular culture begs a psychological explanation.
Similarly, the deliberate use of anthropomorphising lan-
guage could be viewed as the ‘surface’ process that perpetu-
ates a ‘deep’ process of meaning-making. For instance, a 
recent scholarly paper that comments on workplace automa-
tion from the standpoint of organization studies is subtitled 
‘Why Robots Might Not Want to Steal Your Job’ [24]. To 
state the obvious, robots cannot really want anything. The 
author’s question is a rhetorical device, a humorous ‘hook’. 
In the humanities, anthropomorphism is usually defined as 
a literary device whereby writers ascribe humanlike traits, 
feelings, ambitions, or conduct to nonhumans (animals, 
natural phenomena, objects). Classic examples include Col-
lodi’s Pinocchio, first published in 1883, which embodies 
the motif of a manmade humanoid automaton (Pinocchio 
is a wooden doll given the ability to talk, walk, think, and 
feel like a real boy). However, analyses of how tropes and 
other literary devices ‘work’ within a text towards convey-
ing moral, political, or ideological messages, do not explain 
why this imago—the ‘archetypal’ humanoid robot—exists 
and persists.
6  Robot as Other
The ‘semiotic robot hypothesis’ [1] speculates that the 
leitmotif of humanoid automata fulfils some deep need in 
human beings, hence its staying power. The leitmotif sur-
vives because it is the fittest symbolic representation of some 
experiential state. To invoke Jung’s definition of symbol, 
‘it is the best possible expression at the moment for a fact 
as yet unknown or only relatively known, … standing for 
something that is only divined and not yet clearly conscious’ 
([25] para. 817). Unlike an analogy or allegory, a symbolic 
representation in the Jungian sense is not a token or substi-
tute for something known, and does not have a one-to-one 
correspondence to something else. Rather, it is a fantasy 
image, or imago, that draws together elements of bodily 
lived experiences into a gestalt-like whole that has its own 
meaning.
Occurrences of the robot leitmotif might be irreducible 
to any single psychodynamic principle. Nevertheless, it 
could be speculated that in general this imago relates to the 
fact that we experience ourselves as autonomous agents. As 
Fromm averred, ‘Man may be defined as the animal that can 
say “I”, that can be aware of himself as a separate entity’ 
[26, p. 60]. Being an animal that can see itself as a separate 
entity is associated also with a fear of death. Rank [27] sug-
gested that mythological and literary motifs of the double 
might express a desire for immortality. To go a step beyond 
Rank, this may apply also to humanoid automata in myths, 
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folklore, and science fiction, and to some aspects of the dis-
course of social robotics.
Learning to see oneself as a separate entity is a devel-
opmental milestone in early childhood. Around eighteen 
months of age, typically developing toddlers start to rec-
ognise their mirror reflection. This can be verified in a 
procedure (traditionally called the rouge test) in which the 
experimenter discretely puts a smudge on the child’s face, 
or a sticker on the child’s head, without the child realising it, 
and then holds up a mirror for the child to see [28]. Children 
old enough to recognise themselves in the mirror reflection 
often touch their face or head when seeing the unexpected 
smudge or sticker. Some nonhuman animals also pass the 
mirror recognition test. Besides primates, the list includes 
elephants, dolphins, magpies, and more. However, human 
infants go through a phase of being fascinated with their own 
reflection. Lacan called it the ‘mirror stage’ [29]. According 
to his psychoanalytical theory, the external image produces 
in the young child a psychic response that gives rise to a 
mental representation of an ‘I’. Lacan expanded his theory 
of the mirror stage in infancy to propose that human beings 
are driven by a sense of a fundamental lack of something 
inside us that could be called the self. Hence we always 
define ourselves in relation to external objects: to an Other, 
a not-me. In his theory, the mirror stage establishes the ego 
as dependent on the Other.
We are also the only animal that creates artefacts in its 
own image. The compulsion to create humanoid artefacts 
seems to have evolved with homo sapiens. Humanoid figu-
rines carved from mammoth ivory were created between 
40,000 and 35,000 years ago (the Upper Palaeolithic period 
in Europe). These include a lion-man sculpture discovered 
in Germany 1939, and numerous so-called Venus figurines 
discovered in various sites in Europe. Reportedly the oldest 
undisputed example of a depiction of a human being dis-
covered to date is the Venus of Hohle Fels, found in 2008 
in Germany. To archaeologists, Venus figurines serve as 
a source of information about prehistoric material culture 
[30]. A 1989 study that rigorously analysed the diversity of 
figurines found in European Russia concluded, ‘We believe 
that each type of figurine had its own symbolic meaning’ 
(quoted in [30, p. 515]). While the symbolic significance 
that prehistoric figurines had for their makers could never be 
known with any certainty, it is likely to have differed from 
the significance that robots have in modern society.
The psychological constant that is highlighted here is the 
fact that humans are motivated to take some material and 
convert it into something looking like us—and nowadays 
also something that behaves and talks like us. It is as if since 
prehistoric times our species has been compelled to bring 
forth humanoid artefacts so as to create mirror reflections 
of ourselves. It is as if wanting to understand how ‘human’ 
works, we try to build it.
7  Conclusion
The construct introduced here—projective anthropomor-
phism—is a means for defining a class of phenomena, 
potentially bringing its regularities to the fore, and thereby 
beginning to articulate its ensuing implications. As a con-
ceptual tool, the ‘proof of concept’ lies in its timely capac-
ity to open up spaces for exploring a dimension of the 
contemporary discourse of robotics that falls outside the 
remit of cognitive models of anthropomorphic reactions.
Phenomena of projective anthropomorphism can be 
found in social representations of robots in news media, 
documentaries, and other public domain contexts, which 
perpetuate themes and images of humanoids in popular 
culture, and may also precipitate motivations to build and 
invest in humanlike machines. While cultural heritages 
associated with attitudes to robots are widely acknowl-
edged in the robotics-centred literature (see review in [1]), 
scholarly explorations are typically undertaken within 
diverse disciplinary contexts, each with its own priori-
ties and webs of concepts. Conceptualising projective 
anthropomorphism could be a first step towards opening 
up issues that are not readily articulable within existing 
paradigms, and in this way expand the discourse of social 
robots beyond particular practical and ethical issues of 
immediate concern to robot designers and users. The util-
ity of the novel concept and its implications for steering 
technological possibilities are yet to be explored in future 
work. At present, it is the author’s epistemological posi-
tion that identifying and analysing phenomena of projec-
tive anthropomorphism may help towards understand-
ing how humanity’s dialogue with itself is expressed in 
endeavours of social robotics.
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